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LEGAL UNCERTAINTY AND CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE APPLICATION OF
STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN NIGERIA – OKANGA OGBU OKANGA
Abstract
Statutes of limitation, otherwise called limitation laws, are legislative instruments or enactments
that specify the timeframe within which an action or claim relating to a particular subject-matter
may be brought to court. The implication of such enactments, subject to relevant exceptions, is that
once an actionable wrong has occurred, the stipulated timeframe for an action to be instituted begins
to run and if it lapses, without an action being instituted, the injured party would no longer be
allowed to bring the action to court. The right of action would be deemed to have become “statutebarred.” Statutes of limitation are laws made by the legislative arm of government based on its
constitutional powers. In Nigeria, there are two main tiers of government (Federal and State), with
each having power to enact such laws. There appears, however, not to be clear rules defining the
scope of application of the statutes of limitation enacted by the various legislative houses at Federal
and State levels. Thus, there are scenarios of apparent conflict where it appears that more than one
statute of limitation may govern a particular case. This scenario represents a challenge for litigants
since the limitation periods prescribed for a given cause of action – say tort – are not always be the
same in the respective statutes of limitation that may potentially apply. This article examines the
scope of the constitutional powers of the two main tiers of government in Nigeria to legislate on the
subject of limitation of actions, the intersection of laws made pursuant to those powers and how
these may impact on the pursuit and defence of claims by litigants, especially when those claims
cross state lines, border on Federal subjects or border on the administrative/executive actions of
Federal authorities. We hammer that there is an uncomfortable greyness here which requires better
clarity.
Introduction
For litigation lawyers, when a client presents a case in chambers for possible litigation, there is an
onus to consider certain preliminary factors before approaching the court. These factors include: the
cause of action, the justiciability of the cause of action, the client’s legal standing, the court(s) with
jurisdiction, pre-action notice, arbitration clauses, the mode of commencement and whether the
action is caught by a statute of limitation.1
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The list of considerations is not exhaustive and may vary from case to case. See: Goulding S., (1996) ‘Odgers on Civil
Court Actions’, Sweet & Maxwell; Ogbu O.S., (2013) ‘Modern Nigerian Legal System’ Snaap Press Ltd. 3rd ed.
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Limitation of action is a very important consideration in the sense that it has the potential to render
a perfectly good cause unactionable.2 This legal impediment has in recent time received greater
attention as a result of the Supreme Court of Nigeria’s decision in Sifax (Nig.) Ltd v. Migfo (Nig.)
Ltd.3 In that case, the Supreme Court established a landmark precedent to the effect that time pauses
for the entire time when an action is in court.4 In essence, if, for instance, a litigant commences an
action in the wrong court and that action is struck out after a long period of time the period when the
action was in court would not count in the computation of time for the purpose of limitation; and the
litigant may still be able to refile in the appropriate despite the enormity of time that may have
passed.
The Sifax (Nig.) Ltd v. Migfo (Nig.) Ltd.5 decision has since attracted ample reactions from the
Nigerian legal community.6 The decision added an important perspective to the statute of limitation
question whilst, perhaps, reamplifying the need for lawyers to approach the subject with renewed
caution. To be cautious, in our view, also entails standing on the appropriate limitation legislation.
This is crucial in a jurisdiction like Nigeria where there are multiple limitation legislations. There
are presently Limitation Laws in the various states of the Federation as well as the Limitation Act,
an Act of the National Assembly, whose scope of application we shall attempt to discuss herein.
Conflict of Laws
A conflict of laws usually arises where there is “a difference between the laws of different states or
countries in a case in which a transaction or occurrence central to the case has a connection to two
or more jurisdictions.”7 With regard to statutes of limitation, it is pertinent to note that a cause of
action may be subject to different limitation periods in different statutes of limitation. Take, for
instance, the Limitation Law of Lagos State specifies that actions founded on simple contract will
not be brought after a period of six years from when the cause of action accrued. 8 In contrast, the
2

See Hassan v Aliyu (2010)17 NWLR (pt.1223) 547.
(2018) 9 NWLR (Pt.1623) 138.
4
The decision upheld that of the Court of Appeal in the same case.
5
Supra.
6
See: Anjorin A., (2015) ‘Statutory Limitation Period and the Legal Basis for Suspension of Time Computation: A
Review of Sifax Nigeria Limited v. Migfo Nigeria Limited’ The Gravitas Review of Business & Property Law Vol 6, p.
41; Ibezim O., ‘Limitation Of Action: Lost Time Might Not Be Gone Forever – An Analysis Of The Decision In Sifax
Nig. Ltd V Migfo Nig. Ltd’ https://www.lawyard.ng/limitation-of-action-lost-time-might-not-be-gone-forever-ananalysis-of-the-decision-in-sifax-nig-ltd-v-migfo-nig-ltd-by-onyemauche-ibezim/ retrieved March 16th 2019; Nwodo
G., ‘Time Freezes For Purposes Of The Statute Of Limitation When An Action Is Instituted: The Supreme Court's
Decision In Sifax v. Migfo’
http://www.mondaq.com/Nigeria/x/686076/trials+appeals+compensation/Time+Freezes+For+Purposes+Of+The+Stat
ute+Of+Limitation+When+An+Action+Is+Instituted+The+Supreme+Courts+Decision+In+Sifax+V+Migfo retrieved
March 16th, 2019.
7
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999) pg. 295; Hyd Road & Others Tech Ltd & anor v. Abia State Govt & anor (2014)
LPELR-24375(CA).
8
Section 8 of the Limitation Law of Lagos Sate Cap L84 Laws of Lagos State 2015.
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Limitation Law of Delta State specifies a period of five years for actions founded on contract.9
Practically, this means that a contract action may not be litigated in Delta State after five years of
accrual of the cause of action, but the same claim remains litigable in Lagos State for a further one
year. Assuming that the alleged contractual breach occurred in Delta State, but the Defendant resides
in Lagos State, the Claimant may on the sixth year – depending on where the law stands on this issue
– pursue his claim in Lagos State even though the action has already become statute-barred under
the Delta State Limitation Law. This simple illustration, therefore, highlights the fact that a conflict
of limitation laws may also induce some forum shopping.10
Nature and essence of statutes of limitation
The Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “statute of limitation” as:
"A statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when
the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered)"11
In Adeniyi v. Governing Council, Yaba College of Technology,12 the Court of Appeal stated as
follows:
"A statute of limitation in a narrower sense of the term, is an enactment of which the
primary purpose is to set a time limit - a limitation period on the bringing of legal
proceedings in respect of a right of action accruing to a person by virtue of the
common law or some statute other than the limitation statute itself. As a corollary, it
must define the point of time from which the limitation period is to run, and it may in
addition, contain provision for suspending the currency of the period on various
grounds" see Nigerian Law of Limitation of Actions by ELAIGWU E. APEH ELALAP
Publications) Chapter 1, page 1." Per Danjuma, J.C.A. (P. 21, paras. B-E)
A statute of limitation encourages diligent pursuit of claims and discourages the litigation of obsolete
causes. In the case of INEC v. Ogbadibo Local Government & Ors,13 the Supreme Court had this to
say:
“… In ATUNRASE v. SUNMOLA (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.1) 105 at 120, this court giving
reasons why persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable

9

See section 18 of the Limitation Law of Delta State, Cap L11 Laws of Delta State 2006.
This denotes the practice of choosing the most favourable territorial jurisdiction or court in which a matter or cause
may be entertained and adjudicated upon. See Mailantarki v. Tongo & ors (2017) LPELR-42467(SC);
11
See: Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999) p. 422. See also NNPC v. Emelike (2018) LPELR-44180(CA)
12
(2012) LPELR-8434(CA)
13
(2015) LPELR-24839(SC)
10

3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3401069

diligence, this court stated thus; "In all actions, suits and other proceedings at law
and in equity, the diligent and careful actor or suitor is favoured to the prejudice to
him who is careless and slothful, who sleeps over his rights. The law may therefore
deny relief to a party who by his conduct has acquiesced or assented to the infraction
of his rights, or has led the opposite party responsible for or guilty of such
infringement to believe that he has lived (sic) or abandoned his right." It was Abbott
C.J in BATTLEY v. FAULKNER 106ER, 668 at 670 who had this to say: "The statute
of limitation was intended for the relief and quiet of the defendants and to prevent
persons from being harassed at a distant period of time after the committing of the
injury complained of." In the case of BOARD OF TRADE v. LAYSER IRVINE & CO.
LTD (1927) A.C. 610 at 628, Lord Atkinson said: "The whole purpose of the
Limitation Act is to apply to persons who have good causes of action which they could
if so disposed, enforced and to deprive them of power of enforcing them after they
have lain by for a number of years respectively and omitted to enforce them. They
are thus deprived of the remedy which they have omitted to use." This court, in the
case of AJAYI v. ADEBIYI (supra) on the essence of statute of limitation stated as
follows:- "The essence of a limitation law is that the legal right to enforce an action
is not a perpetual right but a right generally limited by statute. Where a statute of
limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal
proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the
prescribed period. Therefore, a cause of action is statute-barred if legal proceedings
cannot be commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the
limitation law had lapsed. An action which is not brought within the prescribed
period, offends the provisions of the law and not give rise to a cause of action. The
yardsticks to determine whether an action is statute-barred are: (a) The date when
the cause of action accrued. (b) The date of commencement of the suit as indicated
in the writ of summons. (c) Period of time prescribed to bringing an action to be
ascertained from the statute in question. Time begins to run for the purposes of the
limitation law from the date the cause of action accrues..." Per Galadima, J.S.C. (Pp.
30-33, paras. B-D)
Similarly, in Attorney-General of Adamawa State & Ors v. Attorney-General of the Federation,14
the Supreme Court outlined the effect and purpose of a statute of limitation as follows:
''A statute of limitation removes the right of action, the right of enforcement and the
right to judicial relief in a plaintiff and leaves him with a bare and empty cause of
action which he cannot enforce if the alleged cause of action is statute-barred, that
is, if such a cause of action is instituted outside the statutory period allowed by such
14

(2014) LPELR-23221(SC),
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law. Another way of stating the above proposition is that any action that is
commenced after the period stipulated by the statute is totally barred as the right of
the plaintiff or the injured person to commence the action would have been
extinguished by such law.'' Per Peter-Odili, J.S.C (P. 31, paras. B-F)15
It is evident from the foregoing judicial pronouncements that statutes of limitation derive their origin
from equitable principles such as laches, standing by and estoppel. It has long been the case that
delay defeats equity and equity takes the side of the vigilant over the indolent. 16 Statutes of
limitation, in that sense, thus deviate from the general and fundamental position that where there is
a wrong there is a remedy. The law expects that a person who has a legal interest to protect would
take the necessary legal steps in a timeous manner, as the interest would not enure in perpetuity. The
law does not encourage anyone to sleep on his right, possibly snore, and saunter into dreamland
and slumber. Then come out when everyone in the community has moved on to begin the agitation
for his stale right. That is why the law brings up statutory and equitable defences to aid the vigilant
against the indolent. It is also meant to safeguard the society which is covered by the well-crafted
public policy that there should be an end to litigation.17
It has been held that the principle of statute of limitation of action is premised on the notion that no
one should remain under threat of being sued indefinitely and that the right to enforce a claim through
the judicial processes of a court of law should not be forever.18 The rationale for the existence of
such statutes is premised on the following factors:- a) that long dormant claims have more cruelty
than justice in them. b) that the person against who they might be made may have lost the requisite
evidence to disprove the claim due to passage of time c) that a person with good cause of action
should pursue them with reasonable diligence.19
Statutes of limitation define when and how a cause of action may be litigated. They do not confer
substantive rights per se but render it legally impossible for affected rights to be actualised in court.
To that extent they are procedural rights rather than substantive rights. In Akwa Ibom State House of
Assembly & Ors v. Mbom,20 the Court made the point that:

15

See: Ibrahim v Judicial Service Committee Kaduna State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1; Obiefuna v Okoye (1961) 1
All NLR 357; Egbe v Adefarasin (NO.2) (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.3) 549; Fadare v A.G., Oyo State (1982) 4 SC 1; Abubakar
v Governor of Gombe State (2002) 17 NWLR (Pt.797) 533.
16
See: Attorney-General of Rivers State v. Gregory Obi Ude (2006) 17 NWLR (pt. 1008) 436); Akapo v. Hakeem-Habeeb
(1992) 7 SCNJ 143
17
See Akpadiaha v. Uko (2017) LPELR-42635(CA)
18
See Civil Service Commission & Anor V. Akwa Ibom State Newspaper Ltd & Anor (2013) LPELR-21138(CA)
19
See: Egbe v Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (47) 1 at 20; Aremo II v. Adekanye (2004) 7 SC (Pt. II) 28; Horikolo v. AGF
(2003) FWLR (184) 349 at 363.
20
(2018) LPELR-44788(CA)
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"Invariably, the statutory limitation [Limitation Law] is most indisputably
procedural, thereby setting time frame within which a suit must be instituted in a
Court or Tribunal.”21
As well as being procedural, it is worth noting that a statute of limitation is a matter of jurisdiction,
hence it can be raised at any stage of proceedings. In Nasir v. Civil Service Commission Kano State
& Ors.,22 the Supreme Court made this point as follows:
"the statute of limitation is a matter of jurisdiction which can be raised at any stage
of litigation, and I will add here, even in the Supreme Court. In my words, in the very
recent case of FRN v. GOLD 2007 11 NWLR part 1044 page 1 which has been cited
by the learned counsel for the respondents:- "There is no doubt this rule connotes
mandatory procedure, but it does not preclude a party from raising the defence of
statute of limitation at an appellant court, vide leave to do so even if he did not do so
at the Court of first instance, because such issue borders on the fundamental issue of
jurisdiction. The appellant in this case realized its mistake in not thrashing out the
issue and so raised it in the Court of Appeal after leave was obtained." Per Mukhtar,
J.S.C. (P. 17, paras. C-G)
Given its nature as a rule of mandatory procedure, the period specified in a statute of limitation,
unlike timelines specified in the rules of court, cannot be waived or extended.23 In El-Rufai v. Senate
of The National Assembly & Ors24, the Court of Appeal held that:
"The Public Officers Protection Act by its Section 2(a) is a statute of limitation. The
law seems quite settled that a time specified in a statute of limitation for filing an
action cannot be extended by the court, unless the statute itself has made provision
for extension of time... " Per Adumein, J.C.A. (P. 44, paras. A-C)25
A statute of limitation may not, however, defeat a cause of action in cases of fraud, lack of capacity,
acknowledgment, disability, etc.26 In such cases, the veil of the statute would be lifted to grant
audience to the merits of the matter.
Statute of Limitation and Nigerian Federalism
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (“the Constitution”) divides legislative
powers between two main tiers of government: the Federal Government and the government of a
21

See also Chigbu v. Tonimas Nig. Ltd. [2006] NWLR [Pt. 984] 189.
(2010) LPELR-1943(SC)
23
See El-Rufai v. Senate of The National Assembly & Ors (2014) LPELR-23115(CA).
24
Supra
25
See Congress for Progressive Change v. INEC & 41 Ors (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 493.
26
See: Administrator & Executors of Estate of General Sani Abacha v. Eke Spiff & Ors (2003) 1 NWLR (Pt. 800) 114;
Lawal & Ors v. Executive Governor, Lagos State & Ors (2017) LPELR-43047(CA).
22
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state.27 Generally, legislative powers are divided between these tiers of government in the manner
prescribed in the Exclusive Legislative List and the Concurrent Legislative List contained in the
Second Schedule of the Constitution. Items on the Exclusive Legislative List can only be legislated
on by the National Assembly. Items on the Concurrent List can be legislated on by both the federal
and state legislatures, with the caveat that federal legislation shall override state legislation where
there is a conflict between them.28
There are cases where a subject matter is neither contained in the Exclusive Legislative List nor in
the Concurrent Legislative List. In such cases, the courts would look first at whether the subject
matter can be deemed incidental or supplementary to any of the items contained in the Exclusive
Legislative List. If yes, then the National Assembly would have exclusive legislative power to
legislate on that subject matter as if it were contained in the Exclusive Legislative List.29 If the
answer is no, then the subject matter would be deemed residual. It falls within the residue of the
legislative powers of the states.30 On residual matters the National Assembly can only legislate for
the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (“FCT”), whilst each state is entitled to legislate for itself,
without Federal interference.31
Item 35 of the Exclusive Legislative List empowers the National Assembly (exclusively) to legislate
on “legal proceedings between Governments of States or between the Government of the
Federation and Government of any State or any other authority or person.”
The law is settled that where the wordings of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be
given their ordinary meaning.32 In our view, the above provision of the Constitution is clear to the
effect that only the National Assembly can legislate on legal proceedings between, inter alia, the
Government of the Federation and any other authority or person. To that extent, it is elementary that
any state law that purports to govern such legal proceedings would be null and void.33

27

See generally section 4 of the Constitution. The legislative powers of the Federal Government are vested in the
National Assembly, whilst the legislative powers of a state are vested in the House of Assembly of that state.
28
See section 4(5) of the Constitution. See: Military Governor of Ondo State & Anor v. Victor Adegoke Adewumo (1988)
6 SCNJ 151; Olaleye-Ote vs. Babalola (2012) 14 NWLR (Pt.1279) 574.
29
See Item 68 of the Exclusive Legislative List. See also A.G. of Ogun State v. Aberuagba (1985) NWLR (Pt.3) 395;
A.G. of the Federation v The A.G. of Lagos State16 NWLR (Pt 1380) 249; Nigerian Soft Drinks v AG Lagos State (1987)
2 NWLR (pt. 57) 444.
30
See: UAC of Nigeria Plc & Ors. v. A-G of Lagos State & Ors. (2010) LPELR-5038(CA); A.- G., Lagos State v. A.-G.,
Federation (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 833); Balonwu v. Obi (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1028) 488.
31
See: section 4(7) of the Constitution; AG Abia State & 2 ors v. AG Federation & ors (2006) 16 NWLR (pt. 1005) 265;
A-G Abia State & 2 ors v. A-G Federation & ors (2002) 6 NWLR (pt. 764) 542.
32
Abacha v. FRN (2014) LPELR-22014(SC) Bernard Amasike vs. Registrar General Corporate Affairs Commission &
Anor. (2010) 5 - 7 SC (Pt.1) 147; Bronik Motors Ltd & Anor. vs Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) NSCC 226
33
See Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Lagos State (supra).
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It is also evident that the above constitutional provision is concerned with the parties. It does not
relate to the subject matter. Thus, it would seem, on the face of it, that regardless of the subjectmatter of dispute, if an action is between the Government of the Federation and any of the parties
contemplated in Item 35, only an Act of the National Assembly can govern such proceedings. It is,
perhaps, worth reiterating the point that limitation laws by their character are procedural laws.
Bearing that position in mind, it would appear that since only the National Assembly can legislate
on legal proceedings involving the Federal Government and any person, only statutory provisions
enacted by the National Assembly can limit the time within which proceedings may be commenced
by or against the Federal Government (including an agency or authority of the Federal Government).
It is, perhaps, worth noting that the power of the National Assembly under Item 35 to legislate on
legal proceedings (particularly limitation of actions) has been exercised through various statutes. For
instance, the Public Officers Protection Act limits the time in which an action may be brought against
a public officer for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law
or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of
any such Act, Law, duty or authority.34 This legislation has been applied by the courts in an
avalanche of cases.35 There are also some subject-specific Federal statutes which limit the time
within which legal proceedings may be instituted under those statutes or against the public
authorities established by those statutes.36
It is worth reiterating that Item 35 is predicated on whom the parties are.37 The Constitution does not
expressly confer on the National Assembly the power to legislate on legal proceedings involving
specific subject matters (even those on the Exclusive Legislative List). The next thing to look at is
whether, in terms of subject matter, limitation of action can be tied to any federal legislative powers,
in which case an incidental power may be inferred. The Exclusive Legislative List consists of various
Items which only the National Assembly may legislate on. These includes matters such as: taxation,
aviation, customs and excise, banking, passports and visas, nuclear energy, mines and minerals,
meteorology, etc.38 Item 68 of the Exclusive Legislative List provides that the National Assembly
shall have power to legislate on any matter incidental to the subjects contained in Items 1 – 66. What
is the scope of these incidental powers? In every case it is a question of construction. It is like hot
oil in a frying pan which must be brought down with caution. The Supreme Court has stressed the
importance of caution in delineating the boundaries of “incidental” legislative powers so that the
ambit of what is incidental would not be overstretched to encroach on the residual legislative powers
34

See Section 2 of the Public Officers Protection Act, Cap P41 LFN 2004.
See for instance: Aiyetan v. The Nigerian Institute of Oil Palm Research [1987] NWLR (Part 59) 48 (SC), AG Rivers
State v. AG Bayelsa State & Anor. (2012) LPELR-9336(SC), Ibrahim v. Lawal & Ors (2015) LPELR-24736(SC), INEC
v. Ogbadibo Local Government & Ors (2015) LPELR-24839(SC).
36
See for instance: section 53 of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act, 2007: section 24 of the
Civil Aviation Act 2006.
37
This appears to be irrespective of the subject matter or the place of commencement of the proceedings.
38
See generally Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution.
35
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of a state.39 The question, therefore, is whether the National Assembly’s power to legislate on the
subject matters in the Exclusive Legislative List also confers an incidental power to legislate on legal
proceedings relating to those subject matters. If the answer is in the affirmative, then only an Act of
the National Assembly may limit actions brought pursuant to such subject matters, regardless of
whom the parties to the action may be and regardless of where the action is commenced. A
consequence of this finding is that the limitation law of a state would not apply to such proceedings
even if the cause of action arose from that state or even if the action were commenced in that state.
This would, no doubt, confine a state’s power to limit actions commenced in its territory to actions
that are founded on concurrent or residual matters. Would this position amount to an overstretch of
Federal legislative power and, thus, an incursion into state legislative territory?
In Benson v Mobil Producing Unlimited,40 the Court of Appeal declined to apply the limitation law
of the state where the lawsuit was brought with respect to a subject matter on the Exclusive
Legislative List. The claim was for compensation for damage caused by an oil spill. The Oil
Pipelines Act – a Federal legislation which relates to an item on the Exclusive Legislative List –
provides a procedure for claiming compensation in such circumstances. The Court suggested that
since no limitation period was prescribed in the Oil Pipelines Act, the Limitation Law of Bayelsa
State, where the cause of action arose, was inconsistent with the Oil Pipelines Act and was, thus,
inapplicable. According to the Court:
"My attention has been drawn to the case of JOHN EBOIGBE (for himself
and on behalf of six other member) V. NNPC (1994) 5 NWLR (PT 347) Page
649. On page 659 of the report Adio JSC (of blessed memory) had this to say:
"Bearing the provisions of section 11(1) of the NNPC Act 1977 and section
4(1) (a) of the Limitation Law Cap 89 of the Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria
1976 which prescribed six years limitation period in mind, the action
instituted by the appellant was prima facie statute barred". The respondent
relying on this statement canvassed that the state limitation law can apply in
respect of a Federal enactment. This cannot with due respect be true in the
face of the provision of the 1999 Constitution and in view of the fact that
Eboigbe's case was an action in respect of destruction of economic crops. It
was not in respect of an item on the exclusive legislative list of the 1999
Constitution. Eboigbe's case (supra) is therefore clearly distinguishable from
this case and the statement of Adio JSC in the case turned on the peculiar
facts of the case. What is more, the concluding part of the lead judgment of
Adio JSC in Eboigbe's case obviates any confusion that might arise on this
issue. His Lordship on page 661 of the report said: "The appellant urge this
39
40

See Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Lagos State (2013) LPELR-20974(SC)
(2012) LPELR 14241
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court to take into consideration the provision of section 25(c) of the Limitation
Law which provide that time should not begin to run until the plaintiff has
discovered the fraud, where fraud is alleged, or his mistake; section 28 of the
Law which empowers a court to refuse the relief on the ground of
acquiescence; and section 21 of the Law which provides that time should not
begin or continue to run when a party is under disability. Whatever may be
the merit, if any, of the submission, the provisions of the Limitation Law
suspending the running of the limitation period prescribed in the Law do not
apply as the provisions of section 11(1) of the Nigeria National Petroleum
Corporation Act, 1979, are applicable notwithstanding anything in any other
enactment." Per Awotoye J.C.A. (Pp. 17-18, paras. A-D)
The Benson decision supports the view that limitation of actions relating to petroleum is incidental
to the Federal legislative power under Item 39 of the Exclusive Legislative List. 41 Thus, only the
National Assembly may legislate to limit an action of that character.
In sharp contrast with the Benson case, the Court of Appeal has in cases such as SPDCN v. Dodoye
West42 and SPDCN Ltd v. Chief Zedie Williams & 2 Ors.43 ruled that a state limitation law was
applicable to any action commenced in the territory of that state irrespective of whether the cause of
action relates to a subject-matter on the Exclusive Legislative List.
In SPDCN v. Dodoye West,44 the Court held that the Limitation Law of Rivers State was applicable
to actions resulting from the Oil Pipeline Act within Rivers State since a claimant could not be
allowed to wait for an indefinite period of time after the accrual of his right to seek judicial redress.
The Court held that whilst there was no limitation period in the Oil Pipeline Act, there was also
nothing in that statute which precluded a defendant from raising a plea of limitation under another
statute, even if a state statute. The Court, in reaching this decision considered and rejected its own
decision in Benson:
“I have noted that in his Ruling delivered on 25th March, 2015 the learned trial Judge
relied on this Court’s decision in BENSON V. MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG) UNLTD
(2014) ALL FWLR {Pt. 722} 1821 - 1822 to dismiss the appellant’s Preliminary
Objection. However, the two previous decisions of this Court (quoted above)
pronounced that a State’s Statute of Limitation is binding on all Courts within the
territorial area of that State and the Supreme Court’s holding on the rationale or

“mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas.”
Supra
43
(Unreported) Appeal No. CA/PH/667/2014
44
Supra (the more recent case on the point)
41
42
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justification supporting the existence of Statute of Limitation in AREMO II V.
ADEKANYE (Supra) cannot be ignored. This Court towed the proper line by
following the two earlier decisions in its recent judgment in SHELL PETROLEUM
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (NIG) LTD V. CHIEF ZEDIE WILLIAMS & 2 ORS.
Appeal No. CA/PH/667/2014 delivered on 6th December, 2017 where GUMEL JCA
pronounced thus: - ‘However, because of what I said earlier on the suitability and
applicability of the 2 earlier decisions of this Court in SUNDAY ETIM V. I.G.P.
(Supra) and COMFORT ASABORO V. PAN OCEAN OIL (Supra) I wish to emphasise
that and proceed accordingly without much ado. But just before that may I, with all
due respect remark that limitation of time provisions either in specific legislation or
general limitation of time stipulations are a public policy imperative that may be said
to have emanated from the equitable doctrines developed in England in the 19th
Century to ameliorate the characteristic harshness of some common law principles.
It started with the equitable maxim that ‘equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent.
The word ‘equity’ here being used as a generic term to mean ‘justice’ or fairness. It
may also be added that the current 2004 volumes of the Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria do not contain a Limitation Act, so if the decision in BENSON V. MOBIL
(Supra) is to hold sway, there would then be no time limitation for any cause of action
that arose out of the provisions of a Federal enactment or matters within the
Exclusive Legislative List. The effect of the decision in BENSON V. MOBIL (Supra)
will then appear to have done the impossible, i.e. overruling 2 previous decisions of
the same Court.’
I am obliged to follow this decision by GUMEL JCA because I was a member of the
panel that concurred with same in my contribution to the well-considered judgment
of my learned brother in the lead judgment. It is therefore my holding that the learned
trial Judge was in error when he held that Section 16 of the Rivers State Limitation
Law, Cap 80 of 1999 does not apply to this suit. Suit No. FHC/PH/CS/294/2013 filed
on 28th August, 2013 is statute barred because the cause of action accrued on 20th
July, 2006 which is more than the five (5) years prescribed in Section 16 of the
Limitation Law of Rivers State.”45

45

From this quote, it is evident that a significant basis of the criticism leveled against the Benson decision by the Court
– and a point of departure – is the idea that there would be an absurd vacuum (where there would be no limitation at all)
if the state limitation law was precluded, since the Federal statute did not prescribe any limitation period. The question
is, what if there was, likewise, no state limitation period applicable to the subject matter in the state where the action
was filed? Would the defendant then be allowed to import a limitation provision from anywhere it could be found? Our
view is that the absence of limitation period in a statute does not mean that an action may be brought at any time the
plaintiff pleases. It is worth remembering that statutes of limitation derive their origin from equity. The follow-up
question is, absent a statutory limitation period, can a defendant, in appropriate circumstances, not successfully fall back
on equity to plead that the plaintiff has overslept on his perceived rights and should therefore be precluded from
maintaining the action?
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In an earlier case, Asaboro v. Pan Ocean Oil (Nig.) Ltd.,46 the appellant contended, inter alia, that
neither the Petroleum Act nor any regulation made thereunder prescribed any period within which a
claimant may commence an action against the holder of an oil mining lease claiming fair and
reasonable compensation, and that in the absence of such provision it would be erroneous to presume
or import a statute of limitation into the case. The Court rejected this submission. According to the
Court:
“With due respect to the learned counsel if it is intended to exclude claims arising
from the Petroleum Act and the Regulation thereunder there would have been express
provision to that effect either in the Act or in the Regulation made pursuant to same.
It cannot be correct or the intention of the law that a claimant, as learned counsel
would imply, could wait for an indefinite period of time after the accrual of his right
to seek redress.” Per Ngwuta JCA (as he then was) at p. 617 paras H – B.
The above decisions, in some respects, find higher judicial support in a Supreme Court authority,
Eboigbe & Ors v NNPC,47 wherein the apex Court applied the Limitation Law of Bendel State to a
claim against the respondent, an agency of the Federal Government, in a claim for damage to the
appellant’s crops allegedly caused by the respondent. Eboigbe was brought to the attention of the
court in the Benson case, but the court elected to distinguish Eboigbe on the ground that the subject
matter of the claim in Eboigbe, damage to the plaintiff’s crops, was not on the Exclusive Legislative
List.
Was the Court of Appeal in Benson entitled to not follow the Supreme Court decision in
Eboigbe?
The firmly-established rule of stare decisis is to the effect that the decision of a higher court on a
particular issue constitutes binding authority on a lower court faced with a similar issue.48 This
makes for certainty of the law.49 It is also a firmly-rooted feature of stare decisis that a case is only
an authority in respect of what it decides.50 Thus, every case must be related to its specific facts and
the issues considered. Failing this blueprint would amount to citing the case out of proper context. In
Eboigbe, the issue of whether the limitation law of a state may apply to an action founded on a
Federal subject matter was not considered. To that extent, we can state that Eboigbe is not an
46

(2006) 4 NWLR (pt. 971) 595
(1994) 5 NWLR (Pt 347) 649
48
See Obiuweubi v. C.B.N. (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1247) 465 S.C; Nigeria Agip Oil Company Ltd v. Nkweke & anor (2016)
LPELR-26060(SC); PDP v. Oranezi & Ors (2017) LPELR-43471(SC)
49
See Eperokun vs. University of Lagos (1986) 4 NWLR (pt. 34) 162; Inc'd Trustees of Holy Apostles Church, Ayetoro
& ors v. Inc'd Trustees of Oneness Faith of Christ Ministry, Ayetoro & ors (2016) LPELR-41368(CA); Ojukwu v.
Agupusi & anor (2014) LPELR-22683(CA)
50
See: Okafor & 3 ors. v. Nnaife. (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.64) 129; Tanko v. The State (2009) LPELR-3136(SC); PDP v.
INEC & Ors (2018) LPELR-44373(SC).
47
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authority to the effect that a state legislation can limit actions founded on a subject matter in the
Exclusive Legislative List. It is worth noting also that the subject matter of the Eboigbe case was
tortious liability, which is a residual matter. To that extent, the Court of Appeal in Benson was,
perhaps, entitled to distinguish the case before it from the Supreme Court’s decision in Eboigbe.
Conflicting Decisions of the Court of Appeal
The law is that where there are conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal is
itself entitled to decide which to follow.51 The consistent position taken by the courts on this issue
of judicial precedent is that a lower court faced with conflicting decisions of a higher court must
follow the latest of those decisions.52 Of course, there is also jurisprudence that suggests that where
a lower Court is faced with conflicting positions of a higher Court on an issue with one position
having one or two decisions of the higher Court in its support and the other position being supported
by an avalanche of decisions of the higher Court, it is wiser for the lower Court to follow the position
with the larger decisions as against the other position.53
With regard to the issue at hand, it goes without saying that the Court of Appeal decision in Benson
v Mobil Producing Unlimited conflicts with the other Court of Appeal decisions discussed herein. It
seems that the weight of authorities – albeit not an avalanche – leans in favour of the position that a
state limitation law does apply to causes of action founded on Federal law in so far as the action is
commenced within the territory of that state. Also, the latest of those authorities, SPDC v. Dodoye
West, also takes the pro-state limitation law view. This view would, thus, seem to represent the
current position of the law. However, given the substantial points raised in the Benson case, as well
as in this article, it is our view that until the Supreme Court resolves these issues, the controversy
remains, and a prudent litigant must work with both judicial trajectories in mind. After all, another
panel of the Court of Appeal may yet, absent a definitive decision of the Supreme Court upholding
the opposite line of authorities, chose to go with the Benson position.
A Federal statute of limitation?
The Limitation Act 200754 (“the Limitation Act”) prescribes time limits in respect of various actions
including actions brought by or against a state authority. Section 68 of the Limitation Act defines
the term “state authority” to include “any authority by which the executive power of the Federal
51

See Usman v Umaru (1992) 7 NWLR (PT 254) 377.
See: Ikeni v. Efamo (2001) 10 NWLR part 720 p.1; Alao v. V.V.C Unilorin (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1069) 421; Daru &
Ors v. Umar (2013) LPELR-21905(CA); Chief Okpozo v. Bendel Newspaper Corporation & Anor. (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt.
153) 652; Mkpedem v. Udo (2000) 9 NWLR (PT. 673) 63; Nwangwu v. Ukachukwu (2000) 6 NWLR (PT. 662). This
position is a departure from some authorities which hold that the lower court is at liberty to choose. See Adegoke Motors
Limited v. Adesanya & ORS (1987) LPELR-20498(CA).
53
See Onuoha v. State (1989) 1 NSCC 411; Obiakor & Ors v. Okafor (2017) LPELR-43309(CA)
54
Cap 522 Laws of the FCT 2007
52
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Government is duly exercised in a particular case.” The state authorities expressly excluded from
the application of the Limitation Act are the Federal Inland Revenue Service and the Board of
Customs and Excise.55 It is often said in law that the express mention of a thing is the exclusion of
another not mentioned.56 Thus, the implication of these provisions is that the Limitation Act would
apply to actions brought by or against any “state authority” that is not expressly exempted.
Validity and scope of the Limitation Act
As we have asserted, the National Assembly, arguably, has powers to make law to: 1. limit actions
by or against the Federal Government (exclusive legislative powers); 2. limit actions brought
pursuant to a subject matter on the Exclusive Legislative List (incidental legislative powers); 3. limit
actions brought within the FCT (residual legislative powers). The Limitation Act, as currently
drafted, touches on each of these legislative powers. However, the scope of the application of the
Limitation Act is questionable on some grounds.
The first ground to challenge the application of the Limitation Act is that it is omitted from the
consolidated Laws of the Federation. The Laws of the Federation have been consolidated three times
since the Limitation Act was enacted in 1966. These were in 1990, 2004 and 2010. On each occasion
the Limitation Act was omitted. Rather, the Limitation Act is included in the Laws of the FCT. This
situation conveys the impression that the application of the Limitation Act is restricted to the FCT.

55

It is also specified that the Limitation Act will not apply where another enactment has fixed the limitation period (such
as the NIMASA Act and the Public Officers Protection Act) or to an action in respect of which a limitation period would
ordinarily be fixed by another enactment if the parties involved were private individuals. In the latter case the state
authority would be treated in the same manner as a private individual. See section 4 of the Limitation Act. The question
is in what actions would a state authority ordinarily be treated in the same manner as a private person. Our view on this
is that a state authority would ordinarily be treated as a private individual where the subject matter of the dispute is not
within the Exclusive Legislative List or where the action is not in respect of something done in exercise of administrative
authority. In reaching this conclusion, we lean on the well-established principle relating to the application of section
251(1)(p)(q) & (r) of the 1999 Constitution. Those provisions confer special status on “state authorities” to the extent
that actions relating to the exercise of their executive or administrative powers may only be commenced before the
Federal High Court. See NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (pt. 798) 79. However, where a claim by or against a “state
authority” borders on non-administrative subject matters such as tort and simple contract, the action may be brought
before courts other than the Federal High Court. In respect of such non-administrative actions a “state authority” is
treated in the same manner as a private individual. See Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. (2005) 6 NWLR (pt.921) pg.393. Juxtaposing
the foregoing position, we submit that the implication of section 4 of the Limitation Act is that in cases of such ordinary
character the Limitation Act would not apply, except in the FCT. For illustrations, if a simple contract claim is instituted
against a “state authority” in a state such as Lagos, the Limitation Act would not apply but the Limitation Law of Lagos
State would apply. Conversely, if a case bordering on the administrative powers of a “state authority” is instituted against
that “state authority”, the Limitation Act would apply regardless of the territory. In the latter case, the “state authority”
is being sued for an official act and not for a “private transaction” where it would be treated in the same manner as a
private individual. To buttress these points, we refer to the case of Osun State Government v. Dalami Nigeria Ltd (2007)
LPELR-2817(SC) where it was held that the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to contract disputes. This is
because the Act seeks to protect public officers/institutions in the exercise of administrative functions and not when
disputes arise from their private-like engagements.
56
Sun Insurance Nigeria Plc v. Umez Engineering Construction Company Ltd (2015) LPELR-24737(SC)
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This is despite significant provisions which make the Limitation Act applicable to actions brought
by or against state authorities (without qualifications as to where an action is commenced).
Does the omission of the Limitation Act from the Laws of the Federation support the conclusion that
the Limitation Act has no application outside the FCT? It is settled law that the courts do not presume
a statute repealed by implication. Where it is intended to repeal a legislation, it must be expressly so
stated by another legislation made by the relevant legislative authority. This is founded on the
principle that only parliament can repeal an Act of parliament.57 In like manner, a statute should not
be deemed redundant or nugatory simply because it is omitted from the consolidated laws. In Ibidapo
v. Lufthansa Airlines,58 the Supreme Court held that the fact that a statute has been omitted from the
consolidated laws does not, of itself, mean that the statute ceases to exist. In the light of the above,
it is our view that the Limitation Act does not cease national application by virtue of its omissions
from the Laws of the Federation and may subsist “federally” to the extent of the legislative powers
of the National Assembly.
In Etim v. Inspector-General of Police,59 the Court of Appeal declined to apply the Limitation Act
(then the Limitation Decree), holding that the application of the Limitation Act was limited
territorially to actions commenced in the FCT. The Court relied on the then section 71 of the
Limitation Act which stipulated that the Limitation Act “shall apply to the Federal Territory only.”
The Court also relied on the provision of section 13 of the Federal Capital Territory Act (“FCT Act”)
which incorporates the Limitation Act as one of the legislations applicable in the FCT.60 The Court
further relied on its previous decision in Raleigh Industries (Nig.) Ltd v. Nwaiwu61 where it held that
the Limitation Act was only applicable to actions commenced in the FCT. The Court held on these
bases that the Limitation Act was only applicable to actions commenced in the FCT. The Court
further held that the Limitation Edict of Kaduna State was applicable to any action commenced in
Kaduna State irrespective of the court, parties or where the cause of action arose. According to the
Court:
“The position however is not the same with regard to the reliance by the lower court
on the Limitation Edict CAP 89 Laws of Kaduna State. It therefore applied to any
action filed in any court of law in Kaduna State including of course the Federal High
Court sitting in Kaduna where the appellants’ chose to file their action against the
respondents. The law applies to any court operating within the territorial area of
Kaduna State without regard as to who the parties in the action are. The word
‘action’ is in fact defined in section 3 of the law to include any proceeding (other
57

See Akintokun v. LPDC (2014) LPELR-22941(SC).
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than a criminal proceeding) in a court established by law of which the Federal High
Court Kaduna is definitely one. In this respect, the lower court was quite right in
applying the law to the present case before it in deciding on the appellant’s claims.”
In this case, the cause of action was breach of contract of employment. The defendant/respondent
was a “state authority” within the meaning of the Limitation Act and a resident of the FCT. At the
risk of repetition, it is implicit from the Court’s pronouncement that a state limitation law would
apply to any civil subject-matter brought within the territory of that state irrespective of the parties
or the subject-matter. Conversely, the Limitation Act would only have applied if the action was
instituted in the FCT.
Section 4(1) of the Constitution vests the legislative powers of the Federation in the National
Assembly. The National Assembly is conferred with powers to make law for the peace, order and
good governance of Nigeria in accordance with its constitutional mandate. The National Assembly
is also empowered to make laws for the FCT in the same manner as a State House of Assembly
would make laws for a state. Furthermore, section 315 of the Constitution provides that, subject to
the provision of the Constitution, an existing law shall have effect with such modifications as may
be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the Constitution, and shall be deemed
to be an Act of the National Assembly to the extent that it is a law in respect to any matter on which
the National Assembly is empowered by the Constitution to make laws. The Constitution also
empowers the President, as “the appropriate authority” to modify an existing law as he deems
necessary or expedient to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the Constitution.62
The implication of the foregoing provisions is that the National Assembly may amend the provisions
of any Federal legislation. Also, where a law survives the military-to-civilian transition of Nigeria
as a Federal existing law, the President may make necessary conformist modifications to it. At the
time Raleigh and Etim were decided, the Limitation Act contained a section 71 – quoted above –
which limited its application to the FCT. That provision now stands deleted as it is no longer present
in the subsisting Limitation Act contained in the Laws of the FCT 2007.63 Importantly, the provisions
which made the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings by or against a “state authority” remain.64
This raises the inference that the restrictions on the scope of application of the Limitation Act
identified in the Raleigh and Etim cases have been done away with. In order words, the Limitation
Act should now apply to proceedings commenced by or against a state authority even if the venue
is outside the FCT.65
62

Section 315(2) of the Constitution. See Attorney-General of Abia State & Ors v. Attorney-General of the Federation
(2003) LPELR-610 (SC)
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One wonders whether the Court of Appeal would have reached a different position on the application of the Limitation
Act if the now deleted section 71 did not exist at the time when Raleigh and Etim were decided.
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See section 1 of the Limitation Act
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For exceptions, please see section 4 of the Limitation Act.
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To add to the above point, it is worth highlighting that the language of section 13 of the subsisting
FCT Act merely states that the statutes listed in its Second Schedule “shall apply in the Federal
Capital Territory.” It does not state that those laws shall apply only in the FCT. The cumulative
implication, in our view, is that the scope of some of those statutes would extend beyond the FCT in
so far as they deal with issues within the legislative competence of the National Assembly as a
Federal legislature. Indeed, there are several statutes which, like the Limitation Act, are listed in the
Second Schedule of the FCT Act that, nevertheless, in appropriate cases, apply outside the FCT.66
Thus, if legal proceedings are commenced by or against an authority of the Federal Government in
a court of law outside the FCT, section 13 of the FCT Act should not prevent a party from relying
on the Limitation Act.
Limitation of action on a state-to-state basis
The conflict of laws challenge in the application of statutes of limitation is not limited to the Federal
vs state law angle. There may also be conflicts regarding multiple state laws. As earlier illustrated
in this paper, it is possible to have a cause of action that crosses state lines. In such cases one may
be confronted with uncertainty as to which state’s limitation law applies. Take for instance a contract
case where the contractual breach occurs in the state of expected performance, but the prospective
defendant resides in a different state. The law allows the claimant to institute the action in the state
where the contract was to be performed or where the defendant resides.67 The Limitation Laws of
these states may contain different limitation periods. Indeed, due to the differences in limitation
periods, the action may be statute-barred in one state whilst remaining open to litigation in the other
state. Which limitation law should apply in situations of such conflict? The case of Etim v. InspectorGeneral of Police68 is authority to the effect that the court is entitled to apply the limitation law of
the state where the action is instituted (which may be where the Defendant resides) and not that of
the state where the cause of action arose (e.g. where the alleged breach occurred).

66

Examples are the Capital Gains Tax Act, the Stamp Duties Act, the Court of Appeal Act, the Oaths Act, the National
Library Act, the Public Officers Protection Act, the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act. The Oaths Act, notably, applies throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria and is used for depositions made at the
registries of all Federal courts in Nigeria (the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court,
etc.) irrespective of where these courts are located. It is a notorious fact that all Federal courts in Nigeria have judicial
venues or judicial divisions outside the FCT. It is notable that “Oaths and affirmations” is neither a matter in the
Exclusive Legislative List nor the Concurrent Legislative List.
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See Order 4 Rule 1(3) of the High Court of Lagos State Civil Procedure Rules 2019; IK Martains (Nig.) Ltd V. U.P.L
(1992) 1 NWLR (Part 217) Page 322; Megatech Engineering Ltd v. Sky Vision Global Networks LLC (2014) LPELR22539(CA).
68
Supra

17

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3401069

Conclusion
It has always been in the interest of both litigants and public policy that there should be an end to
litigation. Thus, the importance of a statute of limitation in litigation cannot be overstated. It makes
for certainty and harmony that the sword of potential litigation should not hang over a person’s head
in perpetuity. Consequently, a would-be litigant has a profound self-obligation to pursue his claim
within a reasonable time. While limitation of action is one of the many offsprings of equity, statutes
of limitation are commonplace in the legal systems of countries such as Nigeria. There, however,
remain significant uncertainties in the scope of application of these limitation laws. The judicial
authorities discussed in this paper, coupled with the referenced statutory authorities, are integral to
the uncertainty. For instance, the issue of whether a state limitation law can apply to an action
founded on a Federal subject is far from settled. The issue of whether a state limitation law can apply
to proceedings involving a Federal authority in respect of its administrative actions is not settled.
Also, the issue of whether the Limitation Act can apply outside the FCT is yet to be settled. Perhaps
only a comprehensive decision of the Supreme Court can lay all these uncertainties to rest. Given
the subsisting conflict of laws and judicial uncertainty highlighted herein, perhaps a prudent litigant
should, where in doubt, plead more than one statute of limitation, albeit in the alternative. The court
would then be left to decide whether and which statute of limitation to apply.
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